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THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM-AN
EXPERIMENT IN LIMITED GOVERNMENT
FORREST RnVEnE BILAcK
"To secure private rights, and at the same time to preserve the
spirit and form of popular government, was the great object to which
their Inquiries had been directed."
(James Madison, speaking of the Constitutional Convention)
Federalist, No. X.
The Constitution of the United States was fashioned by
practical men of affairs who were familiar with and who took
advantage of the lessons gained through centuries of struggle
for liberty. The roots of many features of the American con-
stitutional system lie deep in the past. The bicameral prin-
ciple, originating in England in the fourteenth century, as the
result of an historical accident, became the most appropriate
basis for compromise on the question of representation and was
incorporated into the Constitution. The adoption of the prin-
ciple of the separation of governmental power into three dis-
tinct departments, the legislative, the executive and the judicial,
represents the influence of Montesquieu on the founders of the
Constitution and indicates their acceptance of his admiration
for the English type of government as it was understood in his
day. Many of the phrases and "words of art" employed in our
fundamental law can be traced to the great documents that
stand out as landmarks in English constitutional history. The
common law, perhaps the greatest contribution of the mother
country, is accepted by the states of the Union insofar as it is
applicable to American conditions, and the framework of our
system of courts is based on the English model.
But the outstanding feature of the American constitutional
system is original. In the words of De Toequeville, the Consti-
tution was based "upon a wholly novel theory which may be
considered a great discovery in modern political service." It
* Chief Attorney, Agricultural Adjustment Administration; Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Kentucky, on leave 1935-36; Author of
"Ill Starred Prohibition Cases" with a Foreword by Clarence Darrow(1931); A. B., Wisconsin; M. A., Columbia; LL. B., Ohio State Univer-
sity; Ph. D., Robert Brookings Graduate School of Government; Mem-
ber of Governor Laffoon's Liquor Control Committee.
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constitutes a bold experiment in representative government.
For the first time in history, a people thoroughly imbued with
the ideal of individual liberty, through their representatives in
a constitutional convention, performed the difficult tasks of
strengthening the existing government and at the same time im-
posing restraints upon that government in the hope and belief
that citizens, thus secured in their rights, would be free men.
Those restraints typify the spirit of the American revolt against
the tyranny of govwrnment+
The men in the constitutional convention were familiar with
the history of governments. They knew the experiments that
had been made in pure democracy. They knew the history of
confederations and leagues of states. They realized that the
mother country was a unitary government and that sovereignty
rested in the King and Parliament. And knowing these things,
they resolved in part to break away from the beaten path and
set up a federal government resting on the sovereignty oX the
people as expressed in a written constitution. Up to this time,
federal governments, so-called, had been based on the requisition
principle and had been the mere creatures of the states compos-
ing them.
The novelty of the American plan of government was three-
fold: first, in the fact that the founders set up a limited govern-
ment and that the people kept their sovereignty in their own
hands; second, in the establishment of a dual system of govern-
ment and the nice distribution of power between the states and
the nation as expressed in the fundamental law; and third, in
the fact that the central government operated directly on the
individual. John Fiske describes this accomplishment as "one
of the longest reaches of constructive statesmanship ever known
in the world."'
The delegates in the Constitutional convention had learned
by bitter experience the truth of the adage, "Misers there be,
but not of power." They knew that government, which ought
to protect liberty and right, often is used to oppress and destroy.
They feared above all things, the tyranny of the temporary
majority, a tyranny which is more intolerable than that of any
potentate, because as Burke says, "It is multiplied tyranny."
I The Critical Period of American History, p. 301.
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They feared the spirit of the mob which allows its action to be
controlled by passion and retaliation and selfish desire and which
admits of no responsibility in the use of political power. They
were too wise to allow individual liberty to depend on the benev-
olence of government, so they drew a circle within which gov-
ernment should not penetrate. They set up a constitution which
contained fundamental immunities against governmental power
and which was intended to protect certain rights of all people,
those in the minority as well as those in the majority; aliens as
well as citizens.
Madison summed up the general opinion of the Convention
when he said that to secure private rights against majority fac-
tions, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and form of
popular government, was the great object to which their inquir-
ies had been directed.2
Abraham Lincoln in his First Inaugural Address visualized
the ideal that the framers of the Constitution had attempted to
achieve when he said, "A majority, held in restraint by constitu-
2Federalist, No. 10. Dean Charles Edward Clark of the Yale Law
School has written an article in Fortune for February, 1934, p. 68, deal-
ing with the query, "Does the Constitution Protect Individualism?" Ire
attacks the James M. Beck thesis that "the Constitution (as it protects
individual rights) has been disintegrating for the last fifty years". Dean
Clark asserts that "the Constitution as a bulwark of individualism has
not only not been disintegrating for the last fifty years but on the
contrary has only begun within the last fifty years to be construed
as affording the protection now expected of it". Dean Clark has
discussed the problem solely from the "due process" angle. It is true
that the due process limitation was not placed in the Constitution as
a limitation on state governments until the adoption of the 14th
Amendment (1868). The thesis that Clark discusses as contrasted
with the thesis that he formulates is to trace the veering of the
Supreme Court of the United States in interpreting the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment. Professor Cushman has treated this
phase of our constitutional development in an admirable article in
20 Mich. L. Rev. 737, entitled "Social and Economic Interpretations
of the 14th Amendment". The court has assumed various attitudes
in interpreting due process of law: (1) The period of judicial non-
interference as illustrated by the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36,
81 (1873) where J. Miller said the amendment was intended to pro-
tect colored men only; In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876) the
court declared that the due process clause afforded no protection
against unreasonable rate regulation by legislatures; that the remedy
was at the polls; (2) The second period of Judicial ruthlessness based
on a mechanical and legalistic interpretation of the 14th Amendment
began in the middle of the eighties. This was a period of extreme in-
dividualism when the courts thought in terms of legal concepts such
as freedom of contract and would not look at social or economic facts;
(3) The period starting with the Brandeis type of brief in Muller v.
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tional checks and limitations and always changing easily with
deliberate changes of popular opinion and sentiment is the only
true sovereign of the people. Whoever rejects it, does of neces-
sity fly to anarchy or despotism." Justice Miller of the United
States Supreme Court has well expressed the basis principle of
the American constitutional system as follows: "The tlieory of
our governments, State and National, is opposed to the deposit
of unlimited power anywhere. The executive, the legislative
and the judicial branches of these governments are all of limited
and defined powers. . . . A government which held the
lives, the liberty and the property of its citizens subject at all
times to the absolute disposition and unlimited control of even
the most democratic repository of power is, after all, but a
despotism. It is true that it is a despotism of the many-of
the majority, if you choose to call it so. But it is none the less
a despotism."s
Students of history are familiar with the fact that the Con-
stitutional convention was dominated by an entirely different
philosophy than that underlying the Declaration of Independ-
ence. "The period of 1776 required a philosophy of politics
Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908), the courts become social and economic
experts; and (4) The latest movement toward judicial self-denial
wherein the courts are inclined to accept the legislative finding of
the social and economic facts justifying the legislation. Of course,
it should be understood that there are no hard and fast lines of
demarcation between these various periods and the court sometimes
relapses into the technique of an earlier period. We suggest that Dean
Clark's article should have been given a title somewhat similar to
that of the Cushman article. He does not make out the case for the
proposition that the Constitution does not protect individualism. He
overlooks (1) the history of the debates in the Constitutional Conven-
tion to show the intent of the framers; (2) the history and purpose
behind the Bill of Rights; (3) the influence of the natural rights
theory on government during the first century, i. e., until the 14th
Amendment was adopted (see Meaning of Due Process of Law prior
to adoption of 14th Amendment, 18 Calif. L. Rev. 583, and Recogni-
tion of Natural Rights in State Constitutions, 20 Col. L. Rev. 187);(4) to prove his thesis, he should show affirmatively how legislatures
during the first hundred years passed arbitrary and unreasonable acts
infringing on individual and property rights and that similar legisla-
tion during the last fifty years has been declared invalid under the
due process clause; (5) finally, from the standpoint of individual
property protection, the Clark thesis ignores entirely the Charles A.
Beard doctrine, that the Constitution was essentially an economic
document based upon the concept that the fundamental rights of
property are anterior to the government and morally beyond the
reach of popular majorities. (See Beard, An Economic Interpretation
of the Constitution of the United States (1913), p. 330.)3Loan Association v. Topeka (1875), 20 Wall. 655.
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to justify rebellion against the mother country, that from 1783
on was guided by the great purpose of establishing a firm
national government on the ruins of a feeble confederacy." 4
But the leaders of the Constitutional convention intended that
that new national government should be a government of limited
powers in which the rights of the individual and the minority
would be protected from oppression by majority rule. The
chief danger, Madison thought,5 was not to be apprehended
"from the acts of government contrary to the sense of its con-
stituents, but from the acts in which the government is the mere
instrument of the major number of its constituents." Hence,
he defended the new Constitution because among its many
merits it secured the rights of the minority against the ",superior
force of an interested and overbearing majority."
Other leaders in the Coitstitutional Convention admitted
the change in viewpoint since the signing of the Declaration of
Independence. Gerry asserted that "the evils we experience
flow from the excesses of democracy" 8 and he expressed a belief
that the people were the "dupes of pretended patriots." He
confessed that "he had been too republican heretofore; he was
still however republican, but has been taught by experience the
danger of the levelling spirit.'"'- The leaders in the Constitu-
tional Convention had not abandoned entirely their belief in the
ultimate sovereignty of the people, but their faith in popular
administration of the government had received a severe shock,
with the result that the structure of the government established
by the Constitution was in many respects less democratic than
that of the states.8
Merriam, American Political Theories, pp. 98, 99.
'The Federalist (Ford's Edition) 55.
'2 The Madison Papers, p. 753.
Ibid., p. 758.
*Merriam, American Political Theories, p. 100. In Re Th&e Recogni-
tion of Natural Righ/ts in State Constitutions. See 20 Col. L. Rev. at
p. 187. 1-No less than 31 states have inserted the substance-of the
statement from the Declaration of Independence in their state con-
stitutions, viz.: "All men are created equal and are endowed by their
creator with certain inalienable rights among which are life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness." Ala., Ark., Cal., Col., Del., Fla., Ida.,
Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., Me., Mass., Neb., Nev., N. H., N. *.,
N. C., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Pa., S. D., Utah, Vt., Va., W. Va., Wis., Wyo.
2-No less than 27 states have declared that "the enumeration therein
of certain rights shall not impair or deny others retained by the
people." This is the 9th amendment in the Federal Bill of Rights.
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Charles A. Beard9 in his masterly manner has shown that
the Constitution was essentially an economic document based
upon the concept that the fundamental private rights of prop-
erty are anterior to the government and morally beyond the
reach of popular majorities. Four economic interests were
adversely affected by the system of government under the
Articles of Confederation: (a) holders of public securities, (b)
manufacturers and shippers, (c) money lenders and (d) specu-
lators in western lands. Of the fifty-five delegates to the Con-
stitutional Convention, forty were in class (a), eleven in class
(b), twenty-four in class (c), and fourteen in class (d). Whether
we like it or not, the theories of government that most men
entertain are emotional reactions to their property interests,
and the framers of the Constitution were no exception to the
rule. With all of the genius at their command they attempted
to form a government that would protect their own interests.
Because of stringent property qualifications for suffiage,
not more than one-sixth of the adult males participated through
representatives in the work of framing and ratifying the Con-
stitution. But the leaders anticipated the time when suffrage
might be extended and the "have nots" would outvote the
"haves." They feared the power of the temporary majority
and sought to curb it by the following devices: FIMST: The estab-
lishment of a federal or dual system of government in which the
Constitution of the United States as the supreme law of the land,
distributed the powers between the states and the national gov-
ernment, the latter being a government of ENUMERATED
powers. SEcOND: The principle of the separation of powers in
accordance with which the enumerated powers of the national
government were in turn distributed between the three distinct
departments of that government, the legislative, executive, and
judicial. THmu: Under an elaborate system of checks and bal-
ances, they provided that the House of Representatives should
Ala., Ariz. Ark., Cal., Col., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Iowa, Kan., L'a., Me., Md.,
Minn, Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N. M., N. C., Ohio, Okla., Utah,
Va., Wash., Wyo. 3-Eight states have declared and ordained that "the
natural and inherent rights of the people are excepted out of the
general powers of government and shall forever remain inviolate."
Ala., Ark., Del., Ky., N. D., Pa., Tenn., Texas.
'Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
'United States (1913), p. 330.
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be elected for two-year terms by the people; that the Senate
should be chosen for terms of six years by the state legislatures;
that the President should be chosen by electors for a four-year
term and that the judges of the federal courts should be ap-
pointed by the President and the Senate and should hold for
life, during good behavior. James Madison 0 predicted that
under this system there would "be little probability of a com-
mon interest to cement these different branches in a common
policy." Thomas Jefferson favored the policy of dividing and
limiting public power. He said, "An elective despotism was
not the government we fought for, but one which should not
only be founded on free principles, but in which the powers of
government be so divided and balanced among several bodies of
magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits,
without being effectually checked and restrained by the
others. '11
In the later years, John Adams 12 called attention to the
intricate and complex system of checks and balances in our
federal form of government. He discovered no less than eight
different kinds of balances. These are as follows: (1) the states
and territories against the. federal government; (2) the House
against the Senate; (3) the Executive against the Legislature;
(4) the Judiciary against the House, the Senate, the Executive,
and the state governments; (5) the Senate against the President
in respect to appointments and treaties; (6) the people against
their representatives; (7) the state legislatures against the
Senate; and (8) the electors against the people.' 3
FOURTH: The idea of limited government was further recog-
nized by various express constitutional prohibitions. The fed-
eral government could not lay and collect "direct taxes" unless
apportioned according to population,'- and this limitation made
the exercise of this devastating power practically useless except
in extraordinary circumstances. The states were prohibited
from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts.15
' James Madison's Works, p. 342.
2 Jefferson's Works, v. 3, p. 223.
"2Works of John Adams (1814), p. 46T.2IThe seventh and eighth have become obsolete by virtue of theXVII Amendment and political custom.
21 Art. I, See. 9, 01. 4.
5Art. I, See. 10, Cl. .
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Sir Henry Maine has said of the contract clause, "It has proven
to be thle bulwark of American individualism against demo-
cratic impatience and socialistic fantasy."
FiTH: The doctrine of "judicial review" has made the
courts the guardians of individual and minority rights. This
unique American contribution to the science of government is
based on the following factors: (a) a profound mistrust of legis-
lative bodies by the framers of the constitution. In 1787 it was
a common belief that "the greatest danger to liberty arises from
the expanding power of legislative bodies"" 6 ; (b) that a written
constitution is a paramount and supreme law over ordinary acts
of a legislature ;17 and (c) that the judiciary is the guardian of
the written conitution determining what acts of the legislature
are *agreeable to the constitution."8
Six: Convinced of the rightness of their efforts, the fram-
ers sought to curb majorities in the future by making the amend-
ing cumbersome and dificult. No change could be made in the
fundamental law by majority vote. The founders distrusted
the "divine right of 51% and provided for a two-thirds vote in
both houses of Congress and a ratification by legislatures or
conventions in three-fourths of the states.
SEvmqrH: If there existed any doubt anywhere as to the
nature of the government set up under the ORIGINAL constitu-
tion, the adoption of the first ten amendments must have con-
clusively established the proposition that there were powers
beyond the reach of government and that certain individual and
minority interests were to be protected against the onslaughts
of temporary majorities. In the form in which the Constitution
was submitted to the states for ratification, it did not contain a
bill of rights. Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton were
the great leaders of the two factions for and against the specific
enumeration of individual guarantees in the Constitution.
Hamilton argued "that the Constitution is itself in every ration-
a1 sense and to useful purpose a bill of rights. I go further and
affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which
"Merriam, American Political Theories, 109, 110 (1906).2'Tucker's Blackstone I, 88 (1803 Ed.); James Iredell, "Letters
to an Elector," McRee 2; 145.
Is The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy, Haines, p. 222;
Brinton Coxe, Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation, 241
(1893).
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they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed
Constitution but would even be dangerous. They would contain
various exceptions to powers not granted, and on this very ac-
count would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were
granted; for why declare that things shall not be done which
there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said
that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no
power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will
not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating
power, but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed
to usurp, a plausible pretence for claiming that power. They
might urge with a semblance of reason that the Constitution
ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing against
the abuse of an authority which was not given, and that the pro-
vision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a
clear implication that a power to prescribe proper regulations
concerning it was intended to be vested in the national govern-
ment. This may serve as a specimen of the numerous handles
which would be given to the doctrine of constructive powers by
the indulgence of an injudicious seal for bills of rights."1 9
This sort of an argument, coming from Hamilton, does not
sound very sincere. It is interesting to note that in stating his
case he abandoned his general position as a loose constructionist
and became a strict constructionist for the first and only time
in his life. He went so far as to deny the existence of implied
powers. His real opposition to a bill of rights rested on another
ground. He wanted an all-powerful government uncurbed by
any "fine declarations" and he believed that the security of the
individual "must altogether depend on public opinion and on
the general spirit of the people and of the government. "20 He
also said, "Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the
government with restrictions that cannot be observed; because
they know that every breach of the fundamental laws, although
dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought
to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution
of the country, and forms a precedent for other breaches, where
the same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent
"Federalist, No. LXXXIV, p. 476.
*Ibid., note 19.
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or palpable.21 Hamilton denied the practicability of constitu-
tional limitations on the power of majorities and was thus
opposed to the fundamental principle of the American constitu-
tional system. According to M adison, Hamilton declared in
September, 1787, that "No man's ideas were more remote from
the plan than his were known to be.''22
Jefferson, on the other hand, although not a member of the
constitutional convention was the leader of the movement that
demanded a bill of rights. From Paris, he urged that at least
four of the states should withhold ratification until a declaration
of rights could be annexed, stipulating freedom of religion,
freedom of the press, freedom of commerce from monopolies,
trial by jury in all cases, no suspension of habeas corpus and no
standing armies. 23 In a letter to Madison from Paris, Decem-
ber 20, 1787, he said, "I have a right to nothing which another
has a right to take away . . Let me add, that a bill of
rights is what the people are entitled to against every govern-
ment on earth, general or particular; and what no just govern-
nent should refuse or rest on inference.24
Many people were advocating a conditional ratification or a
second convbntion because of the omission of a bill of rights. To
them, Madison answered by saying, "A conditional ratification
or a second convention appears to me utterly irreconcilable with
the dictates of prudence and safety. Recommendatory altera-
tions are the only ground for a coalition among real Federal-
ists. "25 Madison's advice prevailed and the constitution was
ratified, but with the understanding that a bill of rights would
be added. In fact, seven of the state ratifying conventions sub-
mitted a total of one hundred and twenty-four articles of amend-
ment to the constitution.28
Less than three years after the Constitution went into effect,
ten amendments, constituting the American Bill of Rights, were
adopted. Madison, in introducing the proposed amendments
4 Lodge, Works of Hamilton-Constitutional Edition, v. II, pp. 201,
202.
Ibid., p. 420.
2Beard, American Government and Politics, p. 63.
21 Jefferson's Works, v. 6, p. 388.
5 Madison's Works, v. I, pp. 376-379.
2Ames, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the U. S.,
pp. 183, if.
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in Congress answered the Hamilton argument and effectively
restated the Jeffersonian position. He points out that most of
the state constitutions had provided such limitations on their
governments and although admitting that the national govern-
ment was a government of enumerated powers, he contends that
that government would have a discretionary power liable to
abuse under the Elastic Clause. He said, "The General govern-
ment has a right to pass all laws which shall be necessary to
collect its revenue; the means of enforcing the collection are
within the discretion of the legislature; may not general war-
rants (of arrest) be considered necessary for the purpose, as
well as for some purposes which it was supposed, at the framing
of their state constitutions, the state governments had in view?
If there was any reason for restraining the state governments
from exercising this power, there is like reason for restraining
the Federal government." 2 7
Congress, in submitting the bill of rights to the ratifying
conventions expressed very clearly in a preamble that the pur-
pose of the proposed amendments was simply to prevent miscon-
struction and abuse uf powers by declaratory and restrictive
limitations. Mr. Justice Davis, in one of his great decisions,
pointed out the odcasion for the bill of rights when he said, "So
strong was the sense of the country of their importance, and so
jealous were the people, that these rights highly prized, might
be denied them by implication that when the original constitu-
tion was prepared for adoption it encountered severe opposition;
and but for the belief that it would be so amended as to embrace
them, it would never have been ratified.28 Those great and
good men foresaw that troublous times would arise when rulers
and people would become restive under restraint, and seek by
sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed just and
proper; and that the principle of constitutional liberty would be
in peril unless established by irrepealable law. The history of
' Annals of Congress, v. I, pp. 440, ff.
- In Virginia it was ratified by a majority of 10 in a body com-
posed of 168 delegates. In N. Y. by a majority of 3 in a convention
of 57 delegates. In Mass. by a majority of 19 in a convention of 325
members. These were the three largest states. See Tucker, Limita-
tions on the Treaty Power, p. 423.
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the world had taught them that what was done in the past might
be attempted in the future."2 9
Roughly speaking, the first eight amendments may be classi-
fied into two groups: those designed to protect personal liberty
and those to protect private property against arbitrary interfer-
ence and irregular action on the part of the federal authorities.
The more important provisions in the first class are those guar-
anteeing freedom of speech and the press, freedom of religion,
freedom of assembly, and the safeguards thrown around persons
accused of crime. In the second class is the "due process"
clause, the protection against unreasonable search and seizure
and the provision for payment of just compensation for private
property taken for a public use.
It is to be noted that the first eight amendments contain no
novel declaration of principles. They constitute a restatement
of fundamental rights taken in part from Magna Charta (1815),
the Petition of Rights (1627), The Habeas Corpus Act (1679),
and The Bill of Rights (1689). These great documents are mile-
posts in the struggle of the English race for liberty. "Each
rising wave of freedom left its record in some historic document
-then perhaps the times caused it to recede again-until the
next flood of liberalism came to leave a higher record still."80
They are of incalculable value to the cause of freedom because
they represent in solemn written form the victories of the people
in their fight against tyranny. C. J. Doe of the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire has said, "An American Bill of Rights is a
declaration of private'rights in a grant of public powers. The
general purpose of 5uch a bill of rights is to declare those funda-
mental principles of the common law, generally called the prin-
ciples of English constitutional liberty, which the American
people always claimed as their English inheritance, and the
defense of which was the justification of the War of 1776.''3
Although this priceless heritage comes to us from the mother
country, we must not forget that, in law, the bill of rights in our
Constitution affords a greater prdtedtion to the individual
American than does Magna Charta or any other great document
2 Ex Parte Mifligan, 4 Wall. 2.
0 Stimson, The American Constitution as it Protects Private
Rights (1925), p. 13.
Orr v. Quimby, 54 N. H. Rep. 590.
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in English history to the English citizen. The English Consti-
tution evolved to protect the people from the tyranny of one
department, the executive. Magna Charta was a contract be-
tween King John and the barons. In theory the English Parlia.
ment is always omnipotent and, in fact, the great English con-
stitutional documents were no protection against the Rump
Parliament of the later Commonwealth or against the corrupt
Parliament of the Tudor kings. On the contrary, the first
eight amendments to our Constitution, unless specifically limited,
are restrictions on ALL departments of the government, the
legislative, executive, and judicial.32 The famous case of Bar-
ron v. Baltimore33 is authority for the proposition that the fed-
eral bill of rights is a limitation on the national government
only.
As an extra precaution, these amendments were recom-
mended by the ratifying conventions, who feared both the ex-
cesses of democracy and the excesses of governmental authority.
In order that there might be no misunderstanding, the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments specifically declared the intent of the
founders to try out a great experiment in government. The
Ninth amendment reads, "The enumeration in the Constitution
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others by the people." The Tenth amendment provides, "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution
nor prohibited to it by the states, are reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people."
Thomas Jefferson expressed the political philosophy under-
lying the Constitution of the United States when he said, "It is
jealousy and not confidence which prescribed limited constitu-
tions to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with
power. In questions of power, then, let no more be heard of
2 Ex Parte Millgan, 4 Wall. 2.
17 Peters 243. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, it was as-
sumed for the purposes of the case, that freedom of speech and of the
press are among the personal rights and liberties protected by the
due process clause of the 14th Amendment from impairment by the
states. If the implications of this case are followed, the "liberty" pro-
vision of the 14th Amendment will have the effect of automatically
extending the federal bill of rights as limitations on state govern-
ments; a result which was repudiated in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S.
681, when the attempt was made under the privileges and immunities
clause of the 14th Amendment. See Warren, The "New Liberty" under
the 14th Amendment, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431.
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confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief, by the
chains of the Constitution." Having thus set up mere "parch-
ment barriers", how was this nice distribution of powers between
the states and the central government to be maintained? What
machinery was devised to enforce the constitutional safeguards
in behalf of individual rights? The judiciary has come to play
the role of maintaining the supremacy of the Constitution and
preventing usurpation. It is the function of the Supreme Court
of the United States to settle disputes between a state and an
individual, between state and state and between a state and the
national government. In our constitutional system, this highest
.court stands as the ultimate arbiter, the master referee.
Ex-Senator Lawrence Y. Sherman, of Illinois, has said,
"The history of free government is largely the struggle of
minorities to secure their rights against the dominant and some-
times arrogant majority. While majorities change, memories of
what a majority did while in power, endures. This leads to re-
taliation. Constitutions defend against it. The illustrious men,
who participated in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 under-
stood this principle."34
Many of the world's great political thinkers have been
obsessed by the same fear of majority tyranny. Jellinek de-
clared, "The continued struggle between Authority and Liberty
will again be fought. The dams which today as yet confront
a too-powerful majority-will, may perhaps be demolished. And
then a great crisis will have arrived for the civilized world. We
hope and believe that Society will ultimately discover and realize
this principle, which alone is sufficient to keep it from desolate
intellectual and moral flats and bogs; the recognition of the
rights of minorities." 8 5
De Toequeville said, "If ever the free institutions of Ameri-
ca are destroyed, that event may be attributed to the omnip-
otence of the majority.' '3 Lord Acton has pointed out that
the pure democracies of ancient times failed because there was
no check on the majority. . . . The emancipated people of
"10 Ill.. I Rev. 399.
"The Rights of Minorities. Translated by A. M. & T. Baty (1912),
p. 34.
" Quoted by Lyman Abbott, "The Spirit of Democracy" (1910),
p. 119.
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Athens became a tyrant, and their government, the pioneer of
European freedom, stands condemned with a terrible unanimity
by all the wisest of the ancients. The repentence of the
Athenians came too late to save the Republic; but the lesson of
their experience endures for all times.'13 7 William Howard
Taft has said, "The result in the Roman Republic for similar
reasons was the same. . . Unrestrained tyranny of the
majority will lead to anarchy, and anarchy will lead the people
to embrace and support the absolute rule of one rather than the
turbulent and unreasonable whim of a fractional majority." 3 8
Professor Hearnshaw, an English writer, says in his "Democ-
racy at the Crossways", 39 "There are few things that have
excited graver apprehension among students of democratic in-
stitutions than the possible tyranny of the majority. This ap-
prehension is not limited to antagonists of democracy like Sir
Henry Maine, or Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson; it is shared by men of
pronounced popular and progressive views. Harrington, the
seventeenth century author of Oceana, was a man of advanced
views, yet he expressed dread of the "motions of the multi-
tude"; Lord Acton was a thinker of a most liberal type, yet he
said, "The one pervading evil of democracy is the tyranny of
the majority."
Above all, John Stuart Mill displayed the most con-
suming anxiety "lest the great Leviathan, whose claims he had
so earnestly 'advocated, should, when established in power; be-
have like a brute." In his writings he advocated four specifies:
proportional representation;40 greater weight to the suffrage
of the more educated voter;41 education in the broad sense;42
and the growth of the historical spirit in politics, which may
abate the rashness of reform.43 All of these expedients are no
doubt valuable, but we believe that the framers of the American
Contribution have made the most practical and important contri-
bution toward the prevention of majority tyranny by virtue of
u"Essay on History of Freedom in Antiquity" (1877), republished
in "History of Freedom and Other Essays" by Lord Acton (1907),
pp. 12, 13.
" Popular Government" (1913), pp. 70, 86.
(1918), p. 331.
"Representative Government," ch. VIL
"Dissertations and Discussions," v. III, p. 44.
"Political Economy," Book II, C. XIII, Sec. 9.
""Dissertations and Discussions," v. I, p. 424.
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their novel conception of limited government, whereby in normal
times at least, the misuse of power by the people's own elected
representatives is rendered difficult. Anticipating the rigidity
of their delicately contrived creation, they provided a safety
valve in the amending process.4 4
"For a general discussion of the thesis of this chapter, see Stim-
son, "The American Constitution as it Protects Private Rights" (1923).
